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This thesis studies the impact of forward-looking cost of equity on firms’ Seasoned 
Equity Offerings decisions, the announcement effect and long run post-SEO returns.  
 
As the net present value of investment projects is negatively related to the time-
varying cost of equity, the decision to raise capital for investment opportunities is 
more likely when the cost of equity is low. Using a new measure of forward-looking 
risk premium, I document that the market-wide SEO issuances, firm-level SEO 
likelihood and the proceeds from SEO are all greater when the forward-looking cost 
of equity is low. Small firms’ issuance decisions are particularly sensitive to the 
fluctuation of forward-looking cost of equity, suggesting that the impact from cost of 
equity is greater for firms with tighter financial constraints. Moreover, firms that carry 
out SEOs at higher forward-looking costs of equity have more negative 
announcement returns, which are followed by lower long run post-SEO returns.  
 
I propose a distress based explanation for the observed negative abnormal 
announcement and long run returns. I also document empirical findings that are 
consistent with the distress based explanation. Specifically, firms with higher default 
probabilities and negative net income are more likely to issue SEOs at higher costs of 
equity. Firms with higher default probabilities also receive more negative 
announcement returns when the announcement of a SEO is made at a higher cost of 
equity. Furthermore, firms issuing SEOs at higher costs of equity engage in more debt 
reduction one year after the SEO issuances.  
iv 
 
LIST OF TABLE 
Table 1 










Summary Statistics for Seasoned Equity Offerings................................  
SEO Intensity and Market Cost of Equity.............................................. 
Logistic Regression of SEO Issuance..................................................... 
SEO Proceeds and Cost of Equity.......................................................... 
Abnormal Returns of Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements......... 
Regression Estimates for Announcement Period Stock Returns............ 
 
Abnormal Return of Portfolio Formed by 5 years Post-issuance 
Return..................................................................................................... 
 
SEO Issuance Choice and Distress Likelihood...................................... 
 
SEO Announcement Returns and Distress Likelihood........................... 
 



















Number of SEOs..................................................................................... 
 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a large body of literature on the determinants of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEO) by publicly traded firms. One common reason for a firm to issue SEOs is to 
raise capital for capital expenditures and investment projects (Masulis and Korwar 
1986; Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 2007). Another prominent reason advocated by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) and others is that managers time the market to take 
advantage of over-valuation of their publicly traded securities. Evidence for this 
reason is provided in literature: the clustering of equity issues together (Bayless and 
Chaplinsky 1996), the negative market reaction at SEO announcement time (Asquith 
and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986), and the long run post-SEO 
underperformance (Loughran and Ritter 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995). In 
addition, other papers such as Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and Li, Livdan, and Zhang 
(2009) provide rational reasons for clustering of equity issuances in terms of time 
varying expected returns. Regardless of whether the reason is investment or market 
timing, prior literature suggests expected cost of equity plays an important role in 
seasoned equity offering activities. 
 
However, expected return is quite difficult to estimate. In asset pricing, the most 
common way to estimate expected return is to use historical average of realized 
returns. This historical approach is backward-looking. The decisions to issue SEOs 
for future investments should be affected by the forward-looking cost of equity 
capital, not the historical cost. One approach to derive a forward-looking cost of 
equity is to use analyst forecast data and fit into an earning or dividend discount 
model to obtain an implied cost of equity (e.g. Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
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2001; Gordon and Gordon 1997). However, the estimated cost of equity using this 
approach is sensitive to the model used and the predictive power of analyst forecast 
data. Further, to the extent that analysts have biases (Easton and Sommer 2007), this 
approach may lead to large errors in the forward-looking cost of equity capital. These 
errors may be compounded by the fact that analyst coverage correlates with firms’ 
issuance decisions (Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary 2006).  
 
This paper uses an alternative forward-looking measure for the cost of equity, based 
on the work of Duan and Zhang (2011). Given that this measure relies solely on 
market data, it does not suffer from biases as the implied cost of equity measures 
based on analyst forecasts. Specifically, the methodology developed in Duan and 
Zhang (2011) derives a closed form formula for the forward-looking market risk 
premium under the assumption of a particular form of stochastic discount factor. The 
forward-looking market risk premium is expressed as a function of investors’ risk 
aversion and forward-looking return volatility, skewness, and kurtosis. Using the 
above, one can also compute a firm specific forward-looking risk premium that is 
simply the product of the market forward-looking risk premium and firm beta.  
 
First, this paper examines the impact of market forward-looking risk premium 
(henceforth, MFLRP) on aggregate fraction of SEO issuances, defined as the number 
of SEOs in a given month divided by the number of traded firms at the end of the 
previous month (in thousands). Using data from 1970 to 2009, the fraction of SEO 
issuances is strongly negatively related with the month-end forward-looking market 
risk premium. An increase in the MFLRP by 1% reduces the SEO issuance fraction 
by about 1%. These results include controls for well-known variables that may 
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influence equity offering decisions, such as market timing and other market-specific 
variables. The results are consistent with traditional theories that imply a lower 
expected cost of equity increase the number of seasoned equity offerings. 
 
Next, I conduct a similar test at the firm level. Using a panel data sample, I examine if 
the likelihood of a firm issuing an SEO in a given month is related to its firm-specific 
forward-looking risk premium (henceforth, FFLRP), which is defined as the product 
of beta and the MFLRP. Consistent with the market results, the likelihood of firm 
issuing SEO is higher when the firms’ forward-looking risk premium is low. In 
addition, firms raise a larger amount of capital from SEOs when their forward-looking 
risk premium is low. 
 
The sensitivity of firms’ SEO issuances to their forward-looking risk premium also 
varies with firm characteristics. Firms with smaller size are even more likely to issue 
SEOs when their forward-looking risk premium is low. The results suggest that the 
issuance decisions for small firms with tighter financial constraints are more sensitive 
to the variations in the cost of equity.  
 
Furthermore, I examine the implications of the cost of equity on the SEO 
announcement returns and the long run post-SEO returns. Prior studies document 
negative SEO announcement returns (Asquith and Mullins 1986, Marsulis, and 
Korwar 1986) and long run post-SEO underperformance (Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
1995, Loughran and Ritter 1995). In this study, I explore how these returns relate to 




Firms announcing their seasoned equity offerings at a higher cost of equity should 
receive a more negative market reaction, consistent with pecking order theory models 
of capital structure and costly external financing. I find that this is indeed the case. 
The difference in two days abnormal announcement return for firms issuing at top 
30% of FFLRP and bottom 30% of FFLRP is -0.71% and statistically significant. This 
finding is also consistent with Jung et al. (1996), who documents that firms without 
valuable growth opportunities experience a more negative stock price reaction to 
equity issues than do firms with better investment opportunities. 
 
Next, I perform a calendar-time regression test for the long run post-SEO abnormal 
returns. I find that the long run abnormal post-SEO negative returns are more 
pronounced to firms issuing at high cost of equity. No abnormal long run returns are 
identified for firms issuing at low cost of equity. While market timing theory 
interprets the long run post-issuance underperformance as a correction from the initial 
market over-valuation (Ritter 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995; Baker and Wurgler 2002), my results are inconsistent with 
market timing theory. In particular, market timing theory implies that a more 
pronounced post-issuance underperformance should prevail when the firms time the 
market, which is usually associated with a higher stock price and lower cost of equity.  
I further investigate the reason why firms issue SEOs when their cost of equity is 
high. Inspired by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010)’s findings that an important 
motive for firms’ issuance decision is to “meet a near-term cash need”, I propose a 
distress based explanation. Firms usually have unclear investment objectives when 
their cost of equity is high, so their motives for offering equities are likely to be 
driven by urgent cash needs such as debt repayment. As such, firms that issue SEOs 
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when their cost of equity is high could be doing so for distress related reasons. 
Furthermore, these potentially distressed firms have abnormally low returns 
(Campbell et al. 2006) that might be related to the long-run post-SEO abnormal 
returns. 
 
To test this, I use the probability of default measure computed from Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) and a negative income indicator to capture firms’ distress likelihood. I 
find that firms issuing SEOs at higher cost of equity have higher probabilities of 
default and larger percentages of negative net income. In a cross-sectional setting, 
firms with higher probability of default and negative income are more likely to issue 
SEO at higher cost of equity. Moreover, firms that have a higher probability of default 
and announce their SEO at high cost of equity, receive more negative returns around 
their announcement time. Furthermore, firms issuing SEO at higher cost of equity 
engage in more debt reduction one year after issuance. These effects are consistent 
with the proposed distress based explanation. While full tests of behavioral versus 
rational explanations for SEO issuances are outside the scope of this paper, my results 
are consistent with the distress related reasons for firms issuing SEOs at high cost of 
equity and not driven by possible correlation of the forward-looking cost of equity 
with market timing indicators (even though measures of market timing are explicitly 
controlled for in all regression specifications).  
 
The principal contribution of this study lies in using a direct measure of forward-
looking cost of equity, bridging the gap between studies in SEO and cost of equity. 
The monthly availability of forward-looking risk premium facilitates the study of cost 
of equity on SEO to a greater extent, including the impact on announcement effect. 
6 
 
Second, this study proposes a distress based explanation to reconcile the empirical 
findings of different stock market behavior around SEO at different cost of equity. 
Nevertheless, this study does not preclude other explanations beyond the distress 
based hypothesis. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of related 
literature in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 describes the Seasoned Equity Offering sample and 
the methodology to compute forward-looking risk premium. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical results of the impact of cost of equity on SEO issuance, announcement, and 
long run post-SEO returns. Chapter 5 presents the distress based hypothesis and the 
supporting empirical results. Chapter 6 concludes.     
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter briefly reviews the literature on Seasoned Equity Offerings and the 
measures of cost of equity capital. Selected reviews are conducted based on the 
relevance of the literature to the thesis. 
 
2.1.  Seasoned equity offerings 
Although equity offering is a visible and important activity, its motive varies and the 
literature suggests different reasons for it. A common reason is to raise capital for 
capital expenditure and investment projects. Masulis and Korwar (1986) argue that 
finance capital expenditures is one of the major reasons of equity offerings, which is 
supported by Loughran and Ritter’s (1997) findings that issuers have a larger 
percentage of capital expenditures and R&D expenses compared to non-issuers. 
Obviously, investment decisions are usually determined by the projects’ net present 
value (NPV) that is closely related to the cost of equity. From this perspective, Li, 
Livdan, and Zhang (2009) point out that the negative relationship of investments and 
expected cost of equity are crucial in equity offerings, and they use a Q theory of 
investment to explain equity offering rationales. 
 
Alternatively, market timing literature suggests that managers issue equities for a 
“window of opportunity”. The documented negative market reaction during SEO 
announcements (Acquith and Millins 1986, Marsulis and Korwar 1986) and the long 
run post-SEO negative abnormal returns (Loughran and Ritter 1995, Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995) seem to suggest managers time the offerings at temporary 
market overvaluations. Using market-to-book ratio as a measure of market 
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overvaluation, Baker and Wurgler (2002) document that timed equity offerings cause 
persistent capital structure changes. Nonetheless, this behavioral interpretation is built 
on the premise that managers have better information about temporary market 
mispricing than outside investors, and they act in the interest of existing shareholders.  
 
Rational market timing literature builds on the adverse selection model of Myers and 
Majluf (1984). Instead of timing for overvaluation, rational timing argues that 
managers offer equities when their cost of issuance is low. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 
(1993) argue that during economic expansions, when investment opportunities are 
more profitable, managers are likely to issue equities to time for lower adverse 
selection cost. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) found that equity offerings tend to 
cluster together during  periods with lower announcement effect, and they interpret 
this phenomenon as rational timing. 
 
Schultz (2003) proposes a pseudo market-timing theory to rationalize the long run 
abnormal negative returns after equity issues. He argues that the observed long run 
underperformance is merely a statistical phenomenon. He shows that if managers 
issue equities as stock price increases, on average the issues will be followed by 
underperformance. Therefore, the long run underperformance is irrelevant with 
managers’ forecasting ability.   
 
In a real option model, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2006) interpret that the long 
run post-SEO underperformance is due to the subsequent risk reduction from 
exercising firms’ growth option. In their model, firms’ growth opportunities are risky 
options. Issuing equities to start projects converts risky options to less risky assets in 
9 
 
place. Therefore, their model generates a lower return after equity issuances. In their 
subsequent paper (Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 2010), they document that firms’ 
beta increases before SEO issuances and declines thereafter. They interpret the 
findings as supporting evidence for the risk reduction hypothesis. 
 
More recently, DeAngelo, Deangelo and Stulz (2010) propose two other motives for 
seasoned equity offerings: corporate life cycle and near term cash needs. Although 
firms’ life cycle affects equity offerings decisions, they find that a near-term cash 
need is the most important reason for SEO issuances. In particular, they document 
that most issuers would run out of money without the SEO proceeds, even after 
adjusting for their capital expenditure. 
 
In summary, the literature has yet to reach a consensus for the primary reason of 
seasoned equity offerings. Nevertheless, cost of equity undoubtedly plays an 
important role in the seasoned equity offerings. 
 
2.2.  Cost of equity measures 
A common practice to estimate the expected cost of equity relies on Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). The model expresses the expected cost of equity as the 
product of firms’ risk loading (beta) and the expected market risk premium (Bruner et 
al. 1998). The expected market risk premium is usually estimated by averaging 
historical realized market excess returns. Elton (1999) points out that this historical 
measure has very poor performance and numerous limitations. Moreover, the 
historical measure fails to account for the time varying market conditions (Merton 
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1980). Thus, it is difficult to apply the historical measure on the Seasoned Equity 
Offerings study. 
 
Expected cost of equity can also be derived from the dividend discount model. 
Accounting literature proposes different discount models to estimate the implied cost 
of equity (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan 2001; Gordon and Gordon 1997), and they 
often use analyst forecasted earnings or dividend, and growth rate. Easton and 
Sommer (1997) point out that the analyst forecasts are subject to analysts’ 
psychological biases, and the biases may lead to erroneous conclusions of the implied 
cost of equity capital. Moreover, firms have different analyst coverage. Chang, 
Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006) documented that analyst coverage correlates with firms’ 
seasoned equity offerings decisions, because greater analysts’ coverage reduces firms’ 
information asymmetry. This endogenous association may create unwanted 
interference on the tests of the relationship between Seasoned Equity Offerings and 
the implied cost of equity computed from analyst forecasts.  
 
Duan and Zhang (2011) propose a new method to estimate forward-looking market 
risk premium solely on market data. By assuming a particular form of stochastic 
discount factor, they express the market forward-looking risk premium as a function 
of investors’ risk aversion and forward-looking volatility, skewness, and kurtosis. 
They estimate the investors’ risk aversion from a volatility spread formula using 
option data and the forward-looking higher moments from a GARCH model. The 
forward-looking risk premium is estimated on monthly horizon with one-month 





Campbell and Shiller (1988) derive a log-linear approximation relationship between 
the expected return and dividend. Specifically, they express the expected log return as 
a linear function of log dividend-price ratio and dividend growth rate. Using market 
data, the expected dividend-price ratio and dividend growth rate are estimated from a 




CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Seasoned equity offerings 
The seasoned equity offerings of common stocks in the U.S from 1970 to 2009 are 
obtained from SDC platinum. SEOs are offers involving new shares directly from the 
company, so that pure primary stocks offerings and combination primary-secondary 
stock offerings are included but pure secondary offers are excluded. The sample only 
includes the firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and with share 
code 10 and 11. Utility firms (with beginning SIC code 49) and financial firms (with 
beginning SIC code 6) are removed from the sample. These restrictions result in a 
base sample of 7536 SEOs. Figure 1 plots the times series of SEO offerings on a 
monthly basis. As shown in the figure, the number of SEOs varies from zero issuance 
to 71 issuances per month. There are more issuances during the early 1980s and the 
1990s. Substantially less issuance is observed at the financial crisis period in 1987, 
1998, 2002-2003, and 2008.     
 
The summary statistics for the SEO issuance numbers and amounts are provided in 
Table 1. The number of SEOs are time varying, and so does the number of public 
listed firms. The total number of listed firms in the 1970s is substantially lower 
relative to later periods. Given that CRSP started to record NASDAQ prices from 
1973, the substantially fewer SEOs in the 1970s could be because fewer firms were 
listed during the period.  The fraction of monthly SEO issuance is measured as the 
number of SEOs deflated by the total number of public firms (in thousands) at the end 
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of prior month in CRSP. This measure accounts for the differences in number of listed 
firms across times. 
 
3.2.  Forward-looking risk premium 
The forward-looking risk premium used in this paper is based on Duan and Zhang 
(2011). Denote the market portfolio's cumulative return over the time period t to t + τ 
by Rt(τ). Assuming the stochastic discount factor of the form exp(– γRt(τ)), the above 
paper derives the market forward-looking risk premium as follows,  
  
ߤ௉௧ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߜ௧ሺ߬ሻ െ ݎ௧ሺ߬ሻ
ൎ ൬ߛ െ 12൰ ߪ௉௧
ଶ ሺ߬ሻ െ 3ߛ




ଷ െ 6ߛଶ ൅ 4ߛ െ 1
24 ߪ௉௧
ସ ሺ߬ሻሾߢ௉௧ሺ߬ሻ െ 3ሿ 
(1) 
 
Where μpt(τ) is the mean forward-looking return of market portfolio at time t with 
forward-looking period of τ days; δt(τ) is the dividend yield of market portfolio; rt(τ) 
is the risk free rate. The forward-looking risk premium (μpt(τ) + δt(τ) - rt(τ)) is 
expressed as a function of market portfolio’s volatility σPt(τ), skewness θPt(τ), kurtosis 
κPt(τ) and investors risk aversion (γ). The subscript P is to emphasize the measures are 
under the probability measure of the physical world (as opposite to the risk neutral 
measures).  
 
While the conventional understanding of risk premium under log normality is 
ߤ௉௧ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߜ௧ሺ߬ሻ െ ݎ௧ሺ߬ሻ ൌ ቀߛ െ ଵଶቁ ߪ௉௧ଶ ሺ߬ሻ, the risk premium derived from Duan and 
Zhang (2011)  incorporates skewness and kurtosis in estimating market risk premium. 
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Skewness and kurtosis are important because the observed market returns are 
negatively skewed with fat tails. The above equation (1) implies negative skewness 
and leptokurtosis (fat tails) will generally increase the risk premium. 
 
Following Duan and Zhang (2011), the market portfolio’s volatility, skewness, and 
kurtosis are estimated from an NGARCH (1, 1) model with a moving window of five 
years using daily S&P500 index returns obtained from CRSP. The details for 
estimating the physical moments are provided in Appendix A.1. The investors’ risk 
aversion (γ) is estimated from the volatility spread formula in Bakshi and Madan 
(2006) using the generalized method of moments (GMM). Since the same volatility 
spread formula prevails in Duan and Zhang (2011), the GMM estimation method used 
is consistent with the forward-looking risk premium framework. The option implied 
risk neutral volatility is estimated under a model free approach (Britten-Jones and 
Neuberger 2000; Jiang and Tian 2005), using S&P500 index option data from 
OptionMetrics.  The details of the estimation are provided in Appendix A.2. 
 
Specifically, the forward-looking market risk premium is computed at each month end 
with a forward-looking period of one month (the subsequent month). The forward-
looking market risk premium (MFLRP) is estimated at monthly frequency from 
January 1970 to December 2009. The forward-looking risk premium for individual 
firms (FFLRP) is estimated by the product of individual firm’s beta and the forward-
looking market risk premium, where the firm’s beta is the loading on market factor of 
the regression on Fama and French three factors using the firm’s prior five years 
monthly returns. The plot of the forward-looking market risk premium is shown in 
Figure 2. Consistent with the notion of market risk premium, the MFLRP is higher 
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during volatile market periods (such as 1987, 1998, 2002-2003, 2008) and is lower 
when the market is calm. More importantly, the measure of forward-looking risk 
premium is positive throughout the sample period, which is consistent with the view 
that risk premium is a compensation for investors to take future risks / uncertainties. 
The forward-looking market risk premiums from 1970 to 2009 have a median of 
7.77% and mean of 13.76%. The median of risk premium is close to the magnitude of 
market risk premium estimated by a survey of professors of 6.3% (Fernandez 2009a) 
and within the 3% to 10% range of equity premium used in textbooks (Fernandez 
2009b). The higher mean of the MFLRP reflects the positive skewness of this 
measure, which is mainly driven by crisis periods when investors require a much 
higher risk premium.  
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CHAPTER 4.  
SEASONED EQUITY OFFERING AND COST OF EQUITY 
 
This section presents the empirical results for the impact of cost of equity on SEO 
issuances, its announcement effect and post-SEO returns. In the following 
subsections, I investigate the time series relationship between the aggregate SEO 
issuances and forward-looking cost of equity, followed by a cross sectional study of 
firm’s issuance likelihood and their cost of equity1. The cross sectional studies also 
explore whether the issuance decision for firms with different characteristics are of 
different sensitivity to their costs of equity. Then I continue to examine how the SEO 
announcement effect and long run post-SEO returns differ for firms that conduct SEO 
at different costs of equity. 
 
4.1.  Aggregate SEO issuance and cost of equity 
 
Using the forward-looking market risk premium (MFLRP) as a measure for the 
market’s cost of equity, the following regression examines the time series relationship 
between fraction of SEO issuance and the cost of equity at monthly frequency.  
 
                                                     
1 SEO decisions are likely to be affected by the forward-looking cost of equity for the past few months. 





݊ݑ݉ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ௧ିଵ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܯܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߙଶܩܦܲܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܫܲܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ
൅ ߙସ ൬ܲܧ൰௧ିଵ ൅ ߙହ ൬
ܯ
ܤ ൰௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ଺ܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ଻ܵ݁݊ݐ݅݉݁݊ݐ௧ିଵ
൅ ߙ଼߂ܧܽݎ݊ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵଷ ௧௢ ௧ିଵ




The dependent variable is the monthly number of SEO issuance divided by the 
number of total firms (in thousands) at the end of previous month. The explanatory 
variable of interest is market forward-looking risk premium (MFLRP). Prior theories 
of equity issuances imply ߙଵ to be negative. Similar to Lowry (2003), I controlled for 
aggregate capital demand using the growth rate of quarterly real gross domestic 
product (GDPGrowth), the monthly growth rate of industrial production (IPGrowth); 
possible market overvaluation and price run-up using market price-to-earnings ratio 
(P/E), market market-to-book ratio (M/B), past stock market return (ܴ௧ିଵ); investor 
sentiment (Sentiment); and information asymmetry proxies using the change in 
dispersion of abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
( ߂ܧܽݎ݊ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵଷ ௧௢ ௧ିଵ ) and change in the dispersion of analyst earnings 
forecast (߂ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵଷ ௧௢ ௧ିଵ). 
 
The inclusion of GDP growth and industrial production growth controls for 
macroeconomic condition and firms’ aggregate capital demand. Firms’ issuance 
decisions are likely to be affected by its demand for capital, such as the needs of more 
working capital for investments in booms. The quarterly GDP growth rates are 
obtained from the web site of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the USA. The 
regression uses the GDP growth rate from the most recent quarter. Monthly industrial 
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production indices are obtained from the web site of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. The monthly growth rate of industrial production 
(IPGrowth) is calculated as the percentage change in industrial production from prior 
month.  
 
The inclusion of price-to-earnings ratio, market-to-book ratio, and past market returns 
control for market overvaluation and stock price run-up. Market level price-to-
earnings ratio is measured from S&P500 index, using its month-end close price 
divided by its past 12 month average earnings per share, obtained from Compustat. 
Market-to-book ratio of S&P500 is computed using its month-end close price divided 
by its most recent book value per share, obtained from Compustat. S&P500 return for 
the prior month is used as past market returns. The behavior market-timing theory 
suggests that managers issue equities to exploit misprcing when the market values are 
higher relative to book value, so that the issuances benefit existing shareholders at the 
expense of the entering ones (Baker and Wurgler 2002). Controlling for P/E, M/B, 
and Rt-1 are to make sure the market forward-looking risk premium does not merely 
reflect the market wide overvaluation. Moreover, as P/E ratio also captures cost of 
equity information, the inclusion of P/E ratio also tests whether the forward-looking 
risk premium captures cost of equity information beyond that is captured by the P/E 
ratio.   
 
The inclusion of investors’ sentiment controls for the possibility that managers choose 
to issue equities when investors are over-optimistic and willing to pay more than the 
firms’ value. Investors’ sentiment index is constructed from University of Michigan’s 
Consumer Sentiment Index, using the methodology described in Lemmon and 
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Portniaguina (2006) and used in Hrnjić and Sankaraguruswamy (2011). The sentiment 
index is a residual from the regression of the Consumer Sentiment Index on several 
macro-economic variables2.  
 
Lastly, the information asymmetry proxies control for the time varying adverse-
selection cost of issuing equities. When information asymmetry is high, fewer firms 
would like to issue equities because of the greater adverse selection cost. Two proxies 
of information asymmetry are adopted from Lowry (2003), the change in earning 
announcement dispersion and change in analyst forecast dispersion. The dispersion of 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements is measured at monthly frequency, 
as the standard deviations of abnormal returns over the three days (-1, 1) 
announcement period, across all firms that have earnings announcements in the past 
three months. Analyst forecast dispersion is measured at monthly frequency, as the 
standard deviations of analyst earnings forecasts for each company in the past three 
months, across all companies that are in the last quarter of their fiscal year and have 
analyst forecasts listed on IBES.  
 
The results are presented in Table 2. As predicted, the market forward-looking risk 
premium negatively affects the fraction of SEO issuance while controlling for other 
factors. An increase in the MFLRP by 1% reduces the SEO fraction by 0.4% to 1%. 
This negative relationship is consistent with the view that more firms are likely to 
issue securities when the perceived market cost of equity is lower. The price-to-
earnings ratio of the market and past market returns positively affects the issuance 
fractions, which support the view that managers tend to issue SEOs at a higher price. 
                                                     
2 I would like to thank Emir Hrnjić for providing the data. 
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Changes in analyst forecast dispersion negatively affect the issuance fraction, 
consistent with the adverse-selection costs explanation. Other variables have little 
impact on the SEO fraction.    
 
4.2.  Firm’s likelihood of issuance and cost of equity 
To examine the cross sectional relationship between firms’ SEO decisions and their 
respective cost of equity, I use firm-level forward-looking risk premium (FFLRP) 
which is constructed as the product of the market forward-looking risk premium and 
firm’s beta (the loading on the market factor of the Fama-French three factor 
regression 3  using firms’ past 60 month returns). The cross sectional relationship 
between SEO decisions and firms’ characteristics are examined through logistic 
regressions using panel data on monthly basis.  
 
The logistic regressions serve two purposes. One purpose is to explore how the cost of 
equity affects firm-level issuance decisions, and the other is to examine how the cost 
of equity influences the issuance decisions for firms with different characteristics 
(size and book to market ratio). The regression specification is as following. 
 
ܵܧܱܫݏݏݑ݁௧,௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߙଶܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൈ ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߙଷܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ
ൈ log ൬ܯܤ ൰ ൅ ߙସܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߙହ log ൬
ܯ
ܤ ൰ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݁ݐܽ ൅ ߙ଻ܥܽݏ݄ ൅ ߙ଼ܣ݃݁
൅ ߙଽܱܫܤܦ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܥܽ݌݁ݔ ൅ ߙଵଵܴܦ ൅ ߙଵଶܴܦܦ ൅ ߙଵଷܴ௧ିସ,௧ିଵ   





                                                     




The logistic regressions use the firm-month SEO issuance indicator as the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable is equal to one when there is SEO issuance in a 
particular firm-month and equal to zero otherwise. Stock returns and listings are 
obtained from CRSP and firms’ accounting data are obtained from Compustat. All 
stocks that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with share code 10 or 11 are 
included.  
 
The explanatory variables include the set of variables of interest and the control 
variables. The variables of interest include market and firm forward-looking risk 
premium, and their interactions with size and book-to-market ratio. 
 
The first set of control variables are firms’ characteristics, namely, firms’ size, log 
market-to-book ratio and firm’s beta. Firm size is measured as the nature logarithm of 
its market capitalization at the end of prior month. Firms’ market-to-book ratio is the 
logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book value in the most recent quarter. 
Firms’ betas are calculated by regressing their past 60 month returns on Fama-French 
three factors that are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Observations with less 
than 12 months return data in their prior 60 months are excluded.  
 
The second set of controlling variables are firm’s financial slack (cash and short-term 
investment, Cash), profitability (operating income before depreciation, OIBD), 
research and development expenditures (RD, where RDD is a dummy indicating 
missing RD), capital expenditures and firms’ age. Firm age is defined as the number 
of years listed in the CRSP. Since it is common for firms not to report research and 
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development (R&D) expenditures, firms with missing R&D expenditure are set with 
zero R&D and are identified by a dummy variable (RDD) that indicate their R&D is 
missing (follows Fama and French 2002). For other quarterly variables, namely cash, 
book value, operating income before depreciation and total assets, I replace missing 
values with the values from the most recent quarter within last year. If these values 
are also missing, I use the values from the annual report in the last fiscal year. The 
capital expenditure is only available at annual frequency, so annual data are used.   
 
Lastly, firms’ past three month returns (ܴݐെ4,ݐെ1) are included to control for the pre-
issuance stock run-up effect. Industrial production growth (ܫܲܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ) controls 
for the macroeconomic conditions that affect the aggregate capital demand. Industry 
dummies (defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are included in all logistic 
regressions to control for industry fixed effect. Regression results are presented for 
both the overall sample and the subsample excluding crisis period, where the crisis 
period is defined as the months with extreme observations of forward-looking risk 
premium (October 1987, August 1998, September to November 2008, January and 
February 2009). 
 
Table 3 panel A and B present the results from the logistic regression without and 
with interaction effects, respectively. The reported Z-scores (in bracket) are computed 
from robust standard errors. Consistent with the hypotheses that firms are more likely 
to raise equity capital when their cost of equity is low, the firm’s forward-looking risk 
premium (FFLRPt-1(τ)) negatively affects the SEO issuance likelihood. The results 




The coefficients for size are positively significant, suggesting that larger firms are 
more likely to issue SEOs. One reason suggested by prior literature is that small firms 
have constraints that preclude them from accessing to equity financing (Pettit and 
Singer 1985; Binks, Ennew, and Reed 1992), because small firms are usually subject 
to high information asymmetry that impedes the managers from conveying positive 
information about investment opportunities to outside investors.  
 
The positive coefficients for log(M/B) in the regressions suggest that firms are more 
likely to issue SEOs when their market-to-book ratio is higher. This result is 
consistent with the findings that the SEO firms usually have higher market-to-book 
ratio (Baker and Wurgler 2002; DeAngelo et al. 2010). Firm’s market-to-book ratio, 
which is closely related to Tobin’s q, is often interpreted as firm’s growth potential. 
The positive relationship thus implies that firms with more growth potential are more 
likely to raise capital to support their growth opportunities. Alternatively, the higher 
likelihood of SEO issuance at higher market-to-book value can also be interpreted as 
managers taking advantage of the overvaluations, if the higher market value relative 
to book value represents overvaluation (Baker and Wurgler, 2002)  
 
The coefficients for firms’ beta are positively significant. Carlson, Fisher, and 
Giammarino (2010) propose two explanations for the higher beta prior to issuances. 
The first one is that firms are intrinsically riskier prior to issuance because they have 
more growth options. The higher pre-SEO beta incorporates firms’ risky growth 
options, and beta decreases after the issuance as firms convert the growth options to 
assets in place.  The other interpretation is related to investor sentiment. If individual 
firms’ sentiment co-varies with the market-wide sentiment, and sentiment also drives 
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firms’ issuance decision, issuing firms’ pre-issuance beta will be higher due to the 
systematic sentiment.   
 
Table 3 also presents the relationship between the SEO likelihood and other variables. 
The coefficient for cash and short-term investment is negative, indicating that firms 
are more likely to issue SEOs when they have less cash. The negative relationship is 
consistent with DeAngelo et al. (2010) finding that a near term cash need is an 
important motive for SEOs. Firm age negatively affects the likelihood of SEOs, 
consistent with prior findings that younger firms are more likely to issue SEOs 
(Huang and Ritter 2009; DeAngelo et al. 2010). The coefficients for capital 
expenditures (Capex) and R&D expenditures are positive, suggesting that firms with 
more investment and research expenses are more likely to raise equity capital. The 
results are consistent with Masulis and Korwar (1986)’s argument that SEO proceeds 
are usually used to finance capital expenditures; they are also consistent with 
Loughran and Ritter (1997)’s findings that issuers have larger capital expenditures 
and R&D expenditures compared with non-issuers. The coefficient for lagged three-
month firm’s stock return is positive and significant, suggesting a stock price run-up 
prior to equity issuances. The marginally significant coefficient for industrial 
production growth suggests that macroeconomic conditions have some positive 
impact on the likelihood of issuance, after controlling for other effects.  
 
The regression results with the interaction effects are reported in Table 3 Panel B. The 
interaction term of FFLRP t-1(τ) and size is positively significant, suggesting that the 
SEO issuance likelihood for small size firms is more sensitive to the fluctuations of 
firms’ cost of equity. Small firms are known to have higher information asymmetry 
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(Vermaelen 1981). Firms with higher information asymmetry find it harder to raise 
capital when the cost of equity is high, due to the difficulties in conveying positive 
information to investors. In contrast, it is easier to convey positive issuance motives to 
investors when the cost of equity is low, as it is natural for firms to have more 
positive-NPV projects at these times. Therefore, information asymmetry magnifies 
the sensitivity of small firms’ issuance decisions to the cost of equity. There is no 
significant result for the interaction term of FFLRP t-1(τ) and log(M/B).  
 
4.3.  SEO proceeds and the cost of equity 
Previous sections document that SEO issuance likelihood is affected by the market 
and firms’ forward-looking cost of equity. In this section, I explore whether the 
amount of proceeds from SEOs is also affected by the forward-looking cost of equity. 
A regression is adopted as follows: 
 
ܵܧܱ ݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ
ܣ௣௥௘ௌாை ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܨܮܴ ௣ܲ௥௘ௌாைሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ൬
ܯ
ܤ ൰௣௥௘ௌாை ൅ ߚଷ ൬
ܲܲܧ
ܣ ൰௣௥௘ௌாை




The dependent variable is equal to the SEO primary proceeds divided by the firms’ 
total assets prior to the issuance. The explanatory variables include the market or 
firms’ forward-looking risk premium. The control variables are adopted from Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), which studies the effect of IPO issuance through change of 
leverage.  The control variables are measured prior to SEO, and they are market-to-
book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size. Market-to-book ratio is 
defined as book debt plus market equity then divided by total assets, and it is used as 
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the proxy for market timing or firms’ growth opportunities. Asset tangibility is 
measured by net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. Firms with 
more tangible assets may more likely use debt rather than equity since tangible assets 
can be used as collaterals. Profitability is measured by earnings before interest, taxes 
and depreciation divided by total assets. Profitable firms may have more internal 
funds so they have less need for external capital. Size is measured as the log of net 
sales. Industry dummies (defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are included in all 
regressions to control for industry fixed effect. 
 
The results are presented in Table 4. Both the firms’ and market forward-looking risk 
premium negatively affect SEO proceeds, indicating that firms raise more capital 
when the cost of equity is lower. This result suggests that not only are firms more 
likely to issue at lower cost of equity, but they also tend to acquire more capital from 
the issuances when the cost of equity is lower. The result is consistent with the 
interpretation that when the cost of equity is low, firms have more investment 
opportunities and thus demand for more capital.  
 
The coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is positive, suggesting that firms with 
more growth opportunities tend to raise more capital. It could also indicate that higher 
overvaluation induces larger amount of equity issuance. The negative significant 
coefficient on firms profitability suggest profitable firms are less likely to issue SEOs, 
consistent with the interpretation that these firms are likely to use internal capital. 
Firm size has a negative impact on the SEO proceeds, indicating that larger firms 
obtain less capital proportion relative to small firms. The effect is likely to be driven 
by the normalization of SEO proceeds by firm assets, so that larger firms’ SEO 
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proceeds are lower as a proportion of their already large asset base. Asset tangibility 
does not have any significant impact on the amount of SEO proceeds. 
 
4.4.  SEO announcement effect and cost of equity 
Prior literature documents a negative market reaction to SEO announcements (e.g. 
Asquith and Mullins 1986, Masulis and Korwar 1986). A common interpretation of 
the negative announcement effect is through the adverse selection model of Myers 
and Majluf (1984). The model builds on the premises of asymmetric information, as 
managers know more about the company than outside investors. Based on their 
superior information, managers offer equities when the equities are overvalued. In 
consequence, investors react negatively to equity offerings to adjust for the 
overvaluation. 
 
In this section, I explore whether investors’ reactions to SEO announcements differ by 
the firms’ cost of equity at announcement. The analyses begin with comparing the 
firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around SEO announcement time. All SEO 
firms’ in the sample are separated into three portfolios by the firms’ forward-looking 
risk premium at the month-end prior to SEO announcements. The SEOs firms with 
their forward-looking risk premium below 30 percentile, from 30 to 70 percentile and 
above 70 percentile are denoted as low, median, and high cost of equity, respectively. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns over announcement days (-1, +1) and (0, 
+1) are reported in Table 5. The abnormal returns for individual firms are measured 
using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model and the reported T-value is computed using 
Crude dependence adjustment method that adjust for cross sectional dependence 




Table 5 documents negative CARs of over 2% during the SEO announcement period. 
The results are consistent with prior findings of negative stock price reactions to SEO 
announcements. The CARs for the announcements at low cost of equity is less 
negative (-2.14% and -2.07%) as compared to the CARs at high cost of equity (-
2.71% and -2.78%). The difference between CARs for the announcements at high and 
low cost of equity are statistically significant and of magnitude of 0.57% and 0.71%. 
These results suggest that investors react more negatively for the SEO announcements 
at higher cost of equity.  
 
To further test the impact of cost of equity on SEO announcements CARs while 
controlling for other variables, a regression approach that is similar to Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda (1993) is used as following: 
 
ܥܣܴ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߙଶ∆ܵܪܴ ൅ ߙଷ∆ܮܧܸ ൅ ߙସܥܱܰ ൅ ߙହܴܷܷܰܲ
൅ ߙ଺∆ܤݎ݁ݐ ൅ ߙ଻ܫܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൅ ߝ 
(5) 
 
Firms’ CARs during SEO announcement days (-1, +1) and (0, +1) are the dependent 
variables. The explanatory variable of interest is the firms’ forward-looking risk 
premium (FFLRP). The control variables are adopted from Choe et al. (1993). They 
are: 1) percentage change in share outstanding (ΔSHR), measured by the logarithm of 
shares issued divided by shares outstanding. This variable captures the effect that 
large percentage change in shares outstanding signals overvaluation and causes higher 
adverse selection (Krasker 1986). 2) The change in firms’ financial leverage (ΔLEV), 
measured by the change in debt equity ratio due to the offerings, where debt is 
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measured as the book value and equity is measured as the market value of common 
stocks. This variable is included as the decrease in leverage reduces firm’s default risk 
and is a shift of wealth from stockholders to bondholders. 3) Shareholders 
concentration (CON), measured as the logarithm of market value of stock divided by 
number of shareholders. The variable is included because higher concentration 
encourages closer monitoring and lowers asymmetric information. 4) Stock price run-
up prior to SEO announcement (RUNUP), measured as the cumulative stock return 
over three-month period prior to the offering month. The SEO announcements after a 
stock price run-up is more likely to indicate managers are timing the market. 5) ∆Bret 
is the three-month bond return calculated from 10 years bond index prior to the 
offering month. It is included to capture the effect of fallen interest rate, when bond 
issuances are preferred than stock issuances. 6) Lastly, the growth rate of industrial 
production over the three months prior to the offering month (IPgrowth) is included to 
capture the business cycle effect.  
 
Table 6 presents the results from the CAR regressions. The coefficient for firms’ 
forward-looking risk premium is significantly negative. The result suggests that 
investors react more negatively to SEO announcements at higher cost of equity, after 
controlling for other variables that may affect investors’ adverse selection. However, 
the control variables are generally insignificant. The insignificance results are likely 
caused by the different SEO samples in this paper. Kim and Purnanandam (2011) 
document similar insignificances in their recent SEO paper. 
 
The results from SEO announcement effect are intuitively appealing. Adverse 
selection theory suggests that investors are concerned about firms’ issuance motives. 
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Firms issuing at low cost of equity are more likely to issue for growth or investment 
opportunities, while the motivations for issuances at high cost of equity are 
questionable. Since rational investors are aware of this difference, they react more 
negatively to the SEO announcement at high cost of equity, because they have more 
uncertainties about the firms’ purposes for issuance and worries about the possible 
non-productive use of proceeds (Jung, Kim, and Stulz 1996). Jung et al. (1996) find 
that firms without valuable investment opportunities and with large debt capacity fall 
into this category and are subject to more negative announcement returns. Similarly, 
Pilotte (1992) find that stock prices decline more for mature firms than growth firms 
at security offering announcements.  
 
4.5.  The long run post-SEO effect and cost of equity 
The previous section documents the evidence that investors react more negatively to 
the SEO announcements when the cost of equity is higher. One question inherited 
from the previous section is, if the stronger negative reaction to SEO announcement at 
higher cost of equity is an effect of firms’ non-productive use of proceeds, how do 
these firms perform after SEO issuance? Do investors react correctly and sufficiently 
to the SEO announcements? To address these questions, this section studies the long 
run post-SEO performance for SEOs issued at different cost of equity. 
 
The SEO sample is separated into three portfolios by the firm’s forward-looking risk 
premium at the month-end prior to SEO issuances. The issuances with firm’s forward-
looking risk premium below 30 percentile, from 30 to 70 percentile and above 70 
percentile are denoted as low, median, and high cost of equity issuances. The 
portfolios are formed using Fama’s (1998) monthly calendar-time approach. Each 
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month, a stock is included in the portfolio if the firm issues a SEO within the past five 
years. Such approach generates value-weighted4 portfolios returns for each month. 
The portfolio abnormal returns are calculated from regressing portfolio returns on 
Fama-French three factors and Carhart four factors.  
 
The regression results are presented in Table 7. The post-issuance abnormal returns 
are more negative for the SEO issuances when the cost of equity is higher. The 
abnormal return is about -4.2% (= -0.352%*12) per year for the SEOs at high firms’ 
forward-looking cost of equity, while the abnormal return is marginally significant at 
-2.2% (= -0.186%*12) for the SEOs at median cost of equity, and insignificant for the 
SEOs at low cost of equity.  
 
The long run post-SEO negative abnormal returns are consistent with the findings 
from prior studies (Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995). Nevertheless, I find that 
the long run negative abnormal returns concentrate on the SEOs when firms’ cost of 
equity is high. The result is particularly interesting because the post-SEO abnormal 
long-run performance follows the same direction as the SEO announcement effect, 
and both abnormal returns are more negative when the cost of equity is higher. If 
investors’ concerns of the firms’ non-productive use of proceeds drive the stronger 
negative announcement returns when the cost of equity is high, the long run post-
issuance returns could be driven by the realized bad performance after these 
issuances. For example, investors may further discount the value for the stocks after 
realization of subsequent bad earning announcements (Denis and Sarin 2001).  
 
                                                     
4 Using equal weighted portfolios produces similar results.  
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On the other hand, there is no abnormal return for firms issuing SEOs when their cost 
of equity is low. This result is opposite with what one would expect if the forward-
looking cost of equity simply captures market timing. The market timing theory 
argues that the long run post-issuance underperformance is a correction from the 
initial stock market overvaluation. As stock prices are inversely related to cost of 
equity, the market timing theory would suggest the long run negative abnormal return 
to be more pronounced at lower cost of equity (higher stock price). Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the post-SEO negative abnormal returns when the cost of equity is high 
are caused by market timing.  
 
4.6.  Robustness  
To ensure the robustness of the results, I construct the expected risk premium using 
the log-linear approximation relation from Campbell and Shiller (1988). Specifically, 
the log expected stock return (r) is expressed as a linear function of log dividend-price 
ratio (d-p) and dividend growth rate (Δd).                        
ݎ௧ାଵ ൎ ݇ ൅ ߩ݌௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻ݀௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ 
 ൎ ݇ ൅ ሺ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሻ ൅ ∆݀௧ାଵ െ ߩሺ݀௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ାଵሻ (6) 
Where ߩ ؠ 1/ሺ1 ൅ exp ሺ݀ െ ݌തതതതതതതሻ  and ݇ ൌ െlog ሺߩሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߩሻlog ሺ1/ߩ െ 1ሻ  are 
constant parameters of the model. For annual US data, the steady-state dividend-price 
ratio ݀ െ ݌തതതതതതത  is of about 4%, which gives ߩ  of 0.96. The dividend-price ratio and 
dividend growth rate of the market are deduced from CRSP value weighted index 
with and without distributions. The expected dividend growth rate ( ∆݀௧ାଵ ) and 
dividend price ratio (݀௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ାଵ) are forecasted from vector auto-regression (VAR). 
Expected risk premiums are computed as expected returns minus risk free rate. In this 
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way, I obtained monthly estimates of expected one-year market risk premium5. The 
firm-level risk premium is the product of firms’ beta and the market risk premium. 
 
I conduct similar tests as previous sections using the Campbell-Shiller risk premium 
(hereafter CSRP). The relationship between SEO issuances and the expected CSRP 
are generally consistent with previous results. The CSRP negatively affects the 
aggregate fraction of SEO issuance, but the effect becomes insignificant after 
controlling for the P/E ratio. The abnormal return at SEO announcements is 
significantly more negative for firms announcing SEOs at high firm-level CRSP 
relative to the announcements at low firm-level CSRP. The long run post-SEO 
abnormal returns are significantly negative for the firms that issue SEOs when the 
firms’ CSRP is high, but insignificant for the firms that issue SEOs when the firms’ 
CSRP is low. In conclusion, using Campbell-Shiller expected risk premiums produces 
qualitatively similar results as the forward-looking risk premium of Duan and Zhang 
(2011). 
  
                                                     
5 The seasonality of dividend makes it unreliable to forecast monthly dividend price ratio and dividend 
growth rate, therefore, I use one-year forecasting period. 
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CHAPTER 5.  
WHY DO FIRMS ISSUE WHEN COST OF EQUITY IS HIGH?  
 
Chapter 4 documents that firms are less likely to issue SEOs when their cost of equity 
is high, and if they issue, they are subject to more negative announcement reactions 
and negative post-SEO long run abnormal returns. The results lead to an interesting 
question: why do firms issue when their cost of equity is high? One possible 
explanation is that these firms issue for urgent cash needs, such as debt repayment. 
Jung et al. (1996) find that the firms issuing equity without valuable investment 
opportunities receive more negative announcement returns. Moreover, DeAngelo et 
al. (2009) argue that a near-term cash need is one of the most important SEO motives. 
If the firms issue for distress-related purposes when their cost of equity is high, the 
long run post-SEO abnormal negative returns could be related to the low returns from 
distressed firms (Campbell et al. 2008). This section explores this explanation in 
details.  
 
5.1.  The distress likelihood and SEO issuance likelihood 
The proposed explanation implies that firms issuing SEOs when their cost of equity is 
higher are more likely to be distressed. Therefore, a direct test should compare the 
distress likelihood for firms issuing SEOs when their cost of equity is at different 
levels. Specifically, I use one-year forward-looking default probability and negative 
net income as proxies for firms’ distress likelihood, and test how firms’ SEOs are 




Firms’ default probability is computed using Vassalou and Xing (2004)’s method, and 
the details of the estimation are provided in Appendix B. The default probability is 
measured at the month-end prior to SEO announcement time. Firms’ net income data 
for the nearest fiscal year prior to the SEO issuance are obtained from Compustat. 
 
Table 8 Panel A presents the average default probabilities and percentage of firms 
with negative net income. The average probability of default is significantly higher 
for the firms issuing at high cost of equity (12.44%) compared to the firms issuing at 
low cost of equity (3.64%). Meanwhile, there are a larger percentage of firms with 
negative net income when the cost of equity is high (44.6%) than low cost of equity 
(29.8%). The difference in percentage is statistically significant (14.8%). The 
substantially higher probability of default and larger percentage of firms with negative 
net income is consistent with the explanation that firms issuing at high cost of equity 
are more likely to be distressed.  
 
To test the interaction effect more rigorously, I add the distress likelihood variables, 
and their interactions with firms’ cost of equity, to the logistic regressions that study 
SEO issuance likelihood (in section 4.2). In particular, the regressions include firms’ 
probability of default (PD), a dummy variable that is equal to one when the firm has 
negative net income (NegNI), and their interaction terms with firms’ forward-looking 
risk premium (FFLRP) in addition to the control variables in section 4.2. Please refer 
to section 4.2 for details of the control variables.  
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Table 8 panel B presents the results. The Z-scores in the brackets are computed from 
the robust standard errors. The coefficients for default probability and negative net 
income indicator are both negatively significant. The negatively significant 
coefficients suggest that firms with higher distress likelihood are less likely to issue 
equities. The results are consistent with Fama and French’s (2005) finding that equity 
issues are less likely done by firms under duress. 
 
Interestingly, both the interaction terms (FFLRP×PD and FFLRP×NegNI) are 
positively significant, although the effect for FFLRP×NegNI is weaken upon 
excluding the crisis periods. The positive coefficients from the interaction terms 
suggest that the SEO issuances for firms with higher distress likelihood are less 
sensitive to the fluctuations of their cost of equity. This result also implies that firms 
with higher distress likelihood are more likely to issue SEOs when their cost of equity 
is higher, compared to other firms. Although the effect of FFLRP×NegNI weaken 
after excluding the crisis periods, the disappearing of significance does not contradict 
with the interpretation. The disappeared significance suggests that the impact of 
FFLRP×NegNI on SEO issuance is particularly important during a crisis period. As 
firms are more likely to face cash shortfall during a crisis period, the results are thus 




5.2.  The distress likelihood and SEO announcement 
Section 4.4 document that the negative announcement returns for firms issuing SEOs 
are more pronounced when their cost of equity is high. If investors are aware of the 
distress-based issuance motive, they should penalize the distressed firms that offer 
equities when their cost of equity is high. This section tests whether the 
announcement returns are more negative for the distressed firms announcing SEOs 
when their cost of equity is high. SEO announcement time CAR regressions are used 
as following: 
 
ܥܣܴ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߙଶܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൈ ܲܦ ൅ ߙଷܲܦ ൅ ߙସ∆ܵܪܴ
൅ ߙହ∆ܮܧܸ ൅ ߙ଺ܥܱܰ ൅ ߙ଻ܴܷܷܰܲ ൅ ߙ଼∆ܤݎ݁ݐ ൅ ߙଽܫܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൅ ߝ 
(6) 
 
ܥܣܴ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߙଶܨܨܮܴ ௧ܲିଵሺ߬ሻ ൈ ܰ݁݃ܰܫ ൅ ߙଷܰ݁݃ܰܫ ൅ ߙସ∆ܵܪܴ
൅ ߙହ∆ܮܧܸ ൅ ߙ଺ܥܱܰ ൅ ߙ଻ܴܷܷܰܲ ൅ ߙ଼∆ܤݎ݁ݐ ൅ ߙଽܫܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൅ ߝ 
(7) 
 
The regressions include the probability of default (PD), negative net income (NegNI) 
and their interactions with firms’ forward-looking risk premium as the explanatory 
variables. The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative announcement returns 
from day -1 to day +1. The control variables are the same as equation (5) in section 
4.4. Please refer to section 4.4 for details of the control variables.  
 
The results are reported in Table 9. Consistent with the results in table 6, firms’ cost 
of equity negatively affects the SEO announcement returns. In addition to that, the 
interaction term FFLRP×PD is significantly negative. The negative coefficient 
suggests that the investors penalize SEO announcements for firms that have higher 
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default probability and announce SEOs when their cost of equity is high.  This result 
is consistent with the prior distress-based interpretation. 
  
However, the interaction term for FFLRP×NegNI is not significant. The insignificant 
interaction term suggests that investors do not penalize the firms with negative 
income and announce SEOs at higher cost of equity. Moreover, the different results 
for FFLRP×PD and FFLRP×NegNI imply that investors treat firms with higher 
default probability and negative net income differently. Investors may perceive firms 
with negative net income to be younger, rapid growing firms. Therefore, it is difficult 
for investors to distinguish the distress-based or growth-needs SEO motives. On 
average, they do not penalize or reward the firms announcing SEOs when their cost of 
equity is high. 
 
5.3.  Post-SEO change of debt 
If a firm’s SEO motive is to resolve their urgent cash needs, the firm should engage in 
activities such as debt repayment after the SEO. This section explores issuers’ change 
of debt in the year after the issuances. The distress-based explanation implies that for 
the firms that carry out SEOs when their cost of equity is high, they should reduce 
more debt after the SEO. To study this question, I use a regression that is similar to 
Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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ܲܲܧ
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ܧܤܫܶܦܣ
ܣ ൰௧






In the above regression, t denotes the quarter-end immediately follows SEO issuance. 
The dependent variable is change in debt, which is measured from the end of SEO 
quarter (t) to one year after the SEO quarter (t+1) divided by total assets at time t. 
Book debt is defined as total assets minus book equity, where book equity is defined 
as total assets less liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes. The forward-
looking cost of equity is measured at the month-end prior to the SEO issuance 
(preSEO).  The control variables are measured at the end of SEO quarter. Please refer 
to section 4.3 for the details of the control variables. 
 
Table 10 reports the regression results. The coefficients for both the firms’ and market 
forward-looking risk premium are negatively significant, indicating that firms issuing 
SEOs at higher cost of equity reduces more debt one year after issuance than those 
firms issuing at low cost of equity. The result is consistent with the distress-based 
hypothesis.  
 
The coefficient for the market-to-book ratio is marginally positive. This is different 
from Baker and Wurlger (2002)’s finding that market-to-book continues to affect 
firms’ book leverage after equity issuance. There are two possible reasons. First, the 
dependent variable in (8) is change in debt, while Baker and Wurgler (2002) use book 
leverage. Un-tabulated results using book leverage as the dependent variable justify a 
negative significant coefficient for the market-to-book ratio. Second, this paper 
controls for industry fixed effect. Different industries have different growth 
opportunities and different needs to raise capital. Estimating the regressions without 
industry fixed effect produces insignificant coefficients. Therefore, I refrain from 
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drawing any conclusions from this marginally positive coefficient. Other control 
variables (asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size) are not significant. 
 
The result is particularly interesting when it is compared to the results in Table 4. The 
forward-looking risk premiums have the same sign for results in Table 4 and Table 
10, while the two dependent variables are economically opposite to each other. 
Putting them together, the negative coefficients for the forward-looking risk premium 
suggest that when firms’ cost of equity is high,  the SEO firms raise less capital from 
the SEOs but reduce more debt afterwards. The result is consistent with the distress-
based hypothesis that firms issuing SEOs at high cost of equity are likely to issue for 





CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the impact of forward-looking cost of equity on SEO issuance 
likelihood, SEO announcement reactions, and post-SEO long run returns. Using a new 
measure of forward-looking risk premium as the proxy for the forward-looking cost of 
equity, this paper explores the direct relationship between the cost of equity and SEO 
issuances.   
 
The paper first documents a negative relationship between SEO issuance likelihood 
and the forward-looking cost of equity, i.e. SEO issuances are more likely when the 
cost of equity is low. The SEO decisions for small firms are particularly sensitive to 
their cost of equity, which suggest that the SEO decisions for firms with more 
financial constraints are more affected by their cost of equity.  
 
This paper then examines the SEO announcement returns and the long run post-SEO 
return for firms that carry out SEOs when their cost of equity is at different levels. 
Firms announcing SEOs when their cost of equity is higher receive larger negative 
SEO announcement returns. Moreover, firms issuing SEOs when their cost of equity 
is higher have more pronounced negative long run post-SEO abnormal returns. I 
propose a distress-based hypothesis to explain the phenomena. Firms issuing at higher 
cost of equity are likely to be distressed, and they have negative stock returns because 
of their non-productive use of SEO proceeds, such as for debt repayment.  
 
I investigate the distress-based explanation by looking into the issuing firms’ distress 
likelihood when their cost of equity is high. Firms issuing SEOs when their cost of 
equity is high have higher default probability and larger percentage of negative net 
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income. Moreover, firms with higher default probability receive more negative returns 
during SEO announcements when the cost of equity is high. Furthermore, firms 
issuing SEOs when their cost of equity is high reduce more debt in the year following 
the issuance. These empirical evidences are consistent with the distress-based 
hypothesis. 
 
The relationship between the cost of equity and SEOs lead to interesting future 
research questions. The distress-based hypothesis could be related to Campbell et al. 
(2008)’s distress risk puzzle, which documents that distressed firms have negative 
abnormal returns. Therefore, the empirical evidence from this paper motivates further 
explorations of the underlying driven factor for the low return of the distressed firms, 
and the relationship between distress risk puzzle and SEOs. Notwithstanding, this 
paper does not preclude other explanations.  The negative returns during SEO 
announcements and long run post-SEO negative returns when firms carry out SEOs at 
high cost of equity could also be related to other interpretations, such as the adverse 
selection theory or the real option theory. It is worth further investigation to 
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A.1 The estimation of market portfolio’s volatility, skewness, and kurtosis  
Consider the nonlinear asymmetric GARCH(1,1) model of Engle and Ng (1993), 
hereafter NGARCH(1,1), for the market portfolio’s return dynamic under the physical 
probability P: 
 
݈݊ ܵ௧ାଵܵ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߪ௧ାଵߝ௧ାଵ 
 








ߝ௧ ׽ ݅. ݅. ݀.      ܧ௉ሺߝ௧ሻ ൌ 0 & ܧ௉ሺߝ௧ଶሻ ൌ 0
 
 
For each month-end day, the parameters for the above specification are estimated by 
the quasi-maximum likelihood method using a moving window of 5 years of daily 
S&P500 index returns. The estimations also produce σt+1 and 5 years of standardized 
residuals. 
 
The one-month forward-looking period is 20 trading days (corresponding to 28 
calendar days). Accordingly, the forward-looking physical return volatility can be 
analytically computed as  
ߪ௉௧ଶ ሺ߬ሻ ൌ 1 െ ߣ
ఛ
1 െ ߣ ߪ௧ାଵ
ଶ ൅ ሺ߬ െ 1ሻߚ଴1 െ ߣ െ
ߣሺ1 െ ߣఛିଵሻߚ଴








The forward-looking skewness and kurtosis are computed by the smooth stratified 
bootstrap method of Pitt (2002). A bootstrapped sample size of 100,000 is used to 
advance the system one trading day at a time until reaching the 20-trading day 
maturity. Please refer to Duan and Zhang (2011) for the detailed method description. 
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A.2 The estimation of investors risk aversion 
Similar as Bakshi and Madan (2006), the volatility spread equation forms the basis of 
the estimation of investors risk aversion (γ). Let It be some set of instruments whose 
values are known at time t. The GMM estimation can be conducted using the 
following orthogonality condition: 
 
ܧ ቊߪொ௧
ଶ ሺ߬ሻ െ ߪ௉௧ଶ ሺ߬ሻ
ߪ௉௧ଶ ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߛߪ௉௧ሺ߬ሻߠ௉௧ሺ߬ሻ െ
ߛଶ
2 ߪ௉௧




In order to implement the above expression, we need a time series of risk-neutral 
return variance and three time series of physical return moments (variance, skewness, 
and kurtosis). The estimation of the physical return moments are discussed in 
Appendix A2. The risk-neutral return variance is computed from a model free 
approach by forming appropriate portfolios of broad-based market index options (e.g. 
Carr and Madan 2001). Please refer to Carr and Madan (2001) or Appendix C of 
Duan and Zhang (2011) for the derivations. Specifically, let C(K; St; τ) and P(K; St; τ) 
are the time-t European call and put option prices with strike price K and maturity τ. 
The risk neutral variance can be derived as  
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The option prices for monthly S&P500 index options are obtained from 
OptionMetrics from January 1996 to October 2009. The risk neutral variance is 
computed from these option prices at 28 days before each option expiration date. The 
respective physical moments are also computed at these date. GMM method is used to 
estimate γ. The estimation uses Newey-West adjusted covariance matrix with 
instrument set contains a constant, σ2Q,t-1(τ), σ2Q,t-2(τ), and σ2Q,t-3(τ). In this paper, 
investors risk aversion estimated using data from January 1996 to October 2009. The 








B.1 The estimation of probability of default 
The default probability is estimated from the structural approach of Vassalou and 
Xing (2004). Specifically, the distance to default is estimated as: 
ܦܦ௧ ൌ






Using the normal distribution implied by Merton’s model, the probability of default is 
given by: 
ௗܲ௘௙ ൌ ܰሺെܦܦሻ ൌ ܰ ൮െ






Where ஺ܸ,௧  is the firm’s asset value at time t, with drift ߤ  and volatilityߪ஺ .  . ܺ௧ 
denotes the book value of debt at time t.  
 
Following the conventions in the literature, the forward-looking period T is set to one 
year, and book debt is computed as short term plus half long-term book debt. T-bill 
rate is used as risk free rate. The initial asset value for each trading day is computed as 
market value of equity plus book debt. An iterative procedure that is similar to 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) is used to calculate ߪ஺ and back out ஺ܸ for each firm at 
each month-end. The drift ߤ  is calculated from the mean of change in ln ሺ ஺ܸሻ . . 




Table 1: Summary Statistics for Seasoned Equity Offerings 
This table presents the summary statistics of the SEO sample from 1970 to 2009. The SEO data are from SDC and 
only include the firms with some primary shares offered. Only firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are 
included. Utility and financial firms are excluded from the sample. The # of SEOs presents the number of offerings 
for each decade and the whole sample. Total proceeds are the total value offered for these SEOs and represented in 
millions of dollars. The numbers of listed firms are obtained from CRSP database. 
Period  Mean # of monthly SEOs Mean proceeds (millions) Mean # of listed firms
1970 ‐ 1979  5.17 136.04 4279
1980 ‐ 1989  15.89 514.91 6105
1990 ‐ 1999  24.72 1951.15 7917
2000 ‐ 2009  17.07 2616.16 6972
1970 ‐ 2009  15.70 1326.09 6358
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Table 2: SEO Intensity and Market Cost of Equity 
This table presents the relationship between SEO intensity and the market forward-looking risk premium from 1970 to 2009. The monthly SEO intensity is 
measured by the number of monthly SEO issues deflated by the total number of firms (in thousands) in the prior month. The MFLRPt-1(τ) measures the one month 
forward-looking market risk premium at the end of the prior month (t-1). See section 2.2 for details on the computation of this measure. GDPGrowtht and are the 
quarterly percentage change in GDP obtained from BEA. IPGrowtht is the percentage change in industrial production obtained from Federal Reserve System. P/E 
is the price to earnings ratio for S&P500 index, using 12 month moving earnings per share. M/B is the market-to-book ratio for S&P500 index obtained from 
Compustat.  Sentiment index is constructed from University of Michigan index following Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). Rt-1 is the past market return from 
S&P500 index. The dispersion of abnormal returns around earnings announcements at month t (EarnDispersion) equals the standard deviation of announcement 
abnormal returns across all firms in the past three months. Analyst dispersion in month t is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts for each company in 
the past three months, across companies that are in the last quarter of their fiscal year and have analyst forecasts listed on IBES. T-statistics are computed from 
robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
SEO Fraction 
MFLRPt-1(τ)  ‐0.733 *** ‐0.659 *** ‐1.008 *** ‐0.885  ***  ‐0.670 ** ‐0.351 * ‐0.614 **
(‐4.65)  (‐4.00)  (‐3.65)  (‐4.62)  (‐2.55)  (‐1.82)  (‐2.20) 
GDPGrowtht-1  0.0257  0.0554  **  ‐0.0143  0.0358  ‐0.00426  ‐0.00744 
(0.87)  (2.13)  (‐0.40)  (1.18)  (‐0.12)  (‐0.16) 
IPGrowtht-1  0.0422  0.0340  0.0474  0.0543  0.0647  0.0456 
(1.20)  (1.05)  (1.14)  (1.41)  (1.57)  (1.18) 




Rt‐1  6.637  ***  8.784  ***  4.038  ** 
(3.03)  (3.81)  (1.99) 






Const.  2.544  ***  2.453  ***  1.419  ***  2.693  ***  1.839  ***  2.553  ***  1.531  *** 
(27.52)     (18.84)     (8.52)     (9.15)     (9.09)     (8.80)     (5.94)    
Adj. R‐sq  1.10%  1.10%  15.20%  1.50%  12.70%  4.60%  24.20% 
Nobs  480  480  479  383  381  381  308 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of SEO Issuance 
This table presents the logistic regression results of monthly SEO issuance from 1970 to 2009. The 
dependent variable is firm-month SEO issuance. It is equal to 1 if a specific firm-month issues SEO, 
and equals to 0 otherwise. MFLRP is the one-month forward-looking market risk premium at the end 
of month t-1. See section 2.2 for details on the computation of this measure. FFLRP is the one-month 
firm forward-looking risk premium that is equal to the product of market forward-looking risk 
premium and firms beta. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's market value at the end 
of prior month. Log(M/B) is the natural logarithm of the most recent market-to-book ratio. Beta is 
individual firms' beta estimated from prior 5 years returns. Firm age is equal to the number of years 
that the firms are listed in CRSP. Cash, research and development expenditure (RD), operating 
income before depreciation (OIBD) are obtained from the most recent quarterly reported and deflated 
by total assets. RD is set to zero if R&D expenditure is missing. RDD is a dummy variable that 
equals one if R&D is missing. Capex is the capital expenditures in the fiscal year prior to SEO. Rt-3,t-1 
is the stock return for the prior three months. IPGrowth is the monthly growth rate of industrial 
production. All regressions include industry fix effect. Industry classification is based on Fama-
French 48 industries. Crisis period are defined as the month with extreme value of forward-looking 
risk premium. The z values under the coefficient are computed from the robust standard errors. ***, 








(1)    (2)   (3)    (4)   
FFLRPt-1(τ)  ‐0.168  ***  ‐0.128 ** 
(‐3.56)  (‐2.17)
MFLRPt‐1(τ)  ‐0.428 *** ‐0.537  ***
(‐5.63) (‐4.55) 
Size  0.191  ***  0.193 *** 0.19 ***  0.192  ***
(33.87)  (34.14) (33.68) (34.00) 
log(M/B)  0.717  ***  0.716 *** 0.72 ***  0.719  ***
(50.93)  (50.76) (51.07) (50.83) 
Beta  0.131  ***  0.111 *** 0.125 ***  0.11  ***
(11.61)  (10.50) (10.60) (10.36) 
Cash  ‐0.942  ***  ‐0.941 *** ‐0.949 ***  ‐0.943  ***
(‐12.99)  (‐12.96) (‐13.03) (‐12.96) 
Age  ‐0.0256  ***  ‐0.0257 *** ‐0.0258 ***  ‐0.0258  ***
(‐18.46)  (‐18.46) (‐18.45) (‐18.48) 
OIBD  0.0613  0.0384 0.0933 0.0667 
(0.47)  (0.30) (0.71) (0.51) 
Capex  1.294  ***  1.294 *** 1.286 ***  1.287  ***
(13.83)  (13.74) (13.67) (13.57) 
RD  1.890  ***  1.896 *** 1.899 ***  1.908  ***
(9.86)  (9.77) (9.90) (9.76) 
RDD  0.243  ***  0.238 *** 0.249 ***  0.241  ***
(7.77)  (7.62) (7.94) (7.69) 
Rt‐4,t‐1  0.352  ***  0.355 *** 0.351 ***  0.355  ***
(18.86)  (18.84) (18.81) (18.82) 
IPGrowtht‐1  0.0102  *  0.00962 0.0122 *  0.011  * 
(1.65)  (1.55) (1.94) (1.75) 
                
Industry fixed effect  Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes   
Log likelihood  ‐40,503  ‐40,488 ‐40,246 ‐40,235 
Nobs  2,059,484  2,059,484 2,033,642 2,033,642 
Nobs SEO  6,526  6,526 6,495 6,495 








(5)    (6)   (7)   (8)   
FFLRPt-1(τ)  ‐0.924  ***  ‐0.138 **  ‐0.876 ***  ‐0.0506 
(‐4.75)  (‐2.20) (‐3.75) (‐0.58) 




Size  0.183  ***  0.191 *** 0.182 ***  0.19  ***
(29.44)  (33.83) (29.27) (33.64) 
log(M/B)  0.717  ***  0.721 *** 0.719 ***  0.729  ***
(50.92)  (46.76) (51.06) (46.18) 
Beta  0.137  ***  0.131 *** 0.131 ***  0.126  ***
(12.31)  (11.61) (10.71) (10.71) 
Cash  ‐0.944  ***  ‐0.942 *** ‐0.951 ***  ‐0.948  ***
(‐13.00)  (‐12.98) (‐13.05) (‐13.02) 
Age  ‐0.0256  ***  ‐0.0256 *** ‐0.0256 ***  ‐0.0257  ***
(‐18.39)  (‐18.45) (‐18.34) (‐18.43) 
OIBD  0.0647  0.0633 0.0948 0.0977 
(0.50)  (0.48) (0.72) (0.74) 
Capex  1.293  ***  1.294 *** 1.285 ***  1.286  ***
(13.80)  (13.83) (13.65) (13.67) 
RD  1.897  ***  1.891 *** 1.906 ***  1.901  ***
(9.78)  (9.85) (9.83) (9.87) 
RDD  0.243  ***  0.243 *** 0.249 ***  0.249  ***
(7.77)  (7.78) (7.95) (7.95) 
Rt‐4,t‐1  0.353  ***  0.352 *** 0.352 ***  0.351  ***
(18.91)  (18.85) (18.85) (18.76) 
IPGrowtht‐1  0.0105  *  0.0102 *  0.0123 **  0.0123  * 
(1.69)  (1.65) (1.96) (1.95) 
                
Industry fixed effect  Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes   
Log likelihood  ‐40,498  ‐40,497 ‐40,244 ‐40,246 
Nobs  2,059,484  2,059,484 2,033,642 2,033,642 
Nobs SEO  6,526  6,526 6,495 6,495 





Table 4: SEO Proceeds and Cost of Equity 
This table presents the cross section regression of SEO proceeds on forward-looking cost of 
equity and control variables. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. The dependent variable is 
the  proceeds of SEOs divided by the firms' total assets. MFLRP is the one-month forward-
looking market risk premium prior to issuing month. See section 2.2 for details on the 
computation of this measure. FFLRP is the one-month firm forward-looking risk premium that is 
equal to the product of market forward-looking risk premium and firms beta. The construction of 
other variables follows Baker and Wurgler (2002). Accounting data are obtained from the 
nearest quarterly financial statement prior to SEO. The market-to-book ratio (M/B) is equal to 
assets minus book equity plus market equity and divided by assets. Fixed assets intensity 
(PPE/A) is defined as net property, plants and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability 
(EBITDA/A) is defined as operating income before depreciation, divided by assets. Firm size is 
defined as the log of net sales. T-statistics are computed from robust standard errors. ***, **, * 






(M/B)preSEO  0.0953 *** 0.0954 *** 0.0954  *** 
(10.91) (10.91) (10.94) 
(PPE/A)preSEO  0.0000490 ‐0.000124 ‐0.00449 
(0.00) (‐0.00) (‐0.11) 
(EBITDA/A)preSEO  ‐1.306 *** ‐1.337 *** ‐1.339  *** 
(‐3.86) (‐3.95) (‐3.94) 
log(S)preSEO  ‐0.0725 *** ‐0.0711 *** ‐0.0707  *** 
(‐11.12) (‐10.79) (‐10.92) 
Const.  0.368 *** 0.375 *** 0.377  *** 
(5.91) (6.00) (6.02) 
             
Industry fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes    
Adj. R‐sq  54.00% 54.10% 54.10% 





Table 5: Abnormal Returns of Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal return for the announcement of SEO. Abnormal returns for 
individual firms are measured using Carhart (1997) four factor model. All issuances are separated into low 
(<= 30%), median (30% to 70%) and high(>70%) firm forward-looking risk premium. T-Values for CAR are 
computed using crude dependence adjustment method and are presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Days  Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return
Low FFLRP  Median FFLRP High FFLRP    Diff(High ‐ Low) 
(‐1, +1)  ‐2.14%  ***  ‐2.09% *** ‐2.71% *** ‐0.57%  **
(‐11.57)  (‐12.48) (‐11.64) (‐2.01) 
(0, +1)  ‐2.07%  ***  ‐2.07% *** ‐2.78% *** ‐0.71%  ***





Table 6: Regression Estimates for Announcement Period Stock Returns 
This table presents regression of SEO announcement period cumulative abnormal return on 
explanatory variables. Abnormal returns for individual firms are measured using Carhart (1997) 
four factor model. FFLRP is the firms' one-month forward-looking risk premium at the month-
end prior to the SEO announcement month. ∆SHR is proportional change in outstanding shares 
of common stock, measured as the logarithm of number of shares issued over outstanding 
shares. ∆LEV is the change in debt equity ratio due to the offering, where debt is measured as 
the book value and equity is measured as the market value of common stock. CON is 
shareholder concentration, which is measured as the logarithm of total market value of stocks, 
divided by total number of shareholders.  RUNUP is cumulative stock returns over the three-
month period prior to the announcement month. ∆Bret is the three-month bond return calculated 
from 10 years bond index prior to the announcement month. IPGrowth is the growth rate of 
industrial production for the three months prior to the announcement month. T-statistics are 
computed from robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
CAR(‐1,+1)   CAR(0,+1) 














Const.  ‐2.325 *** ‐2.534  *** 
(‐3.04) (‐3.98) 






Table 7: Abnormal Return of Portfolio Formed By 5 years Post-issuance Return 
This table presents the post-issuance long run performance of portfolios separate by the firm forward-looking risk premium at SEO issuance. See section 2.2 for details on 
the computation of the forward-looking risk premium. All issuances are separated into low (<= 30%), median (30% to 70%) and high (>70%) firm forward-looking risk 
premium. The portfolios are constructed by value weighting post-issuances return for the SEO companies if the return in a month is within five years of their issuance. The 
portfolio returns are regressed on Fama-French three factors and Carhart four factors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,and 10% levels, respectively.  
Low FFLRPt‐1(τ)   Median FFLRPt‐1(τ)    High FFLRPt‐1(τ)  
Abnormal Ret  0.032  0.134 ‐0.211 * ‐0.186 ‐0.321 ** ‐0.352 **
(0.19)  (0.77) (‐1.73) (‐1.5) (‐2.12) (‐2.28)
Rm‐Rf  0.912  ***  0.890 *** 1.109 *** 1.104 *** 1.266 *** 1.272 ***
(22.96)  (22.28) (39.39) (38.58) (36.25) (35.85)
smb  0.156  ***  0.166 *** 0.210 *** 0.212 *** 0.426 *** 0.423 ***
(2.75)  (2.97) (5.24) (5.29) (8.57) (8.49)
hml  ‐0.227  ***  ‐0.265 *** ‐0.257 *** ‐0.266 *** ‐0.194 *** ‐0.183 ***
(‐3.79)  (‐4.37) (‐6.06) (‐6.13) (‐3.70) (‐3.40)
umd  ‐0.112 *** ‐0.027 0.034
      (‐3.00)       (‐1.00)       (1.02)  
Adjusted R‐sq  64.29%  64.97% 84.04% 84.04% 82.24% 82.24%




Table 8: SEO Issuance Choice and Distress Likelihood 
Panel A presents the mean one-year probability of default and percentage of negative net income for SEO 
firms. Probability of default (PD) is calculated from Vassalou and Xing (2004) model and measured at 
announcement month. Net income (NI) is obtained from the financial statement prior to SEO issuance month. 
All issuances are separated into low (<= 30%), median (30% to 70%) and high (>70%) firm forward-looking 
risk premium. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
   
Panel B presents the interaction of cost of equity with probability of default and negative net income in the 
logistic regression of SEO likelihood. The dependent variable is firm-month SEO issuance. It is equal to 1 if a 
specific firm-month issues SEO, and equals to 0 otherwise. MFLRP is the one-month forward-looking market 
risk premium at the end of month t-1. See section 2.2 for details on the computation of this measure. FFLRP is 
the one-month firm forward-looking risk premium that is equal to the product of market forward-looking risk 
premium and firms beta. PD is the probability of default calculated from Vassalou and Xing (2004) model. 
NegNI is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firms have a negative income prior to SEO. Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the firm's market value at the end of prior month. Log(M/B) is the natural logarithm of the 
most recent market-to-book ratio. Beta is individual firms' beta estimated from prior 5 years returns. Firm age 
is equal to the number of years that the firm is listed in CRSP. Cash, research and development expenditure 
(RD), operating income before depreciation (OIBD) are obtained from the most recent quarterly reported and 
deflated by total assets. RD is set to zero if R&D expenditure is missing. RDD is a dummy variable that equals 
one if R&D is missing. Capex is the capital expenditures in the fiscal year prior to SEO. Rt-4,t-1 is the stock 
return for the prior three months. IPGrowth is the monthly growth rate of industrial production. All regressions 
include industry fix effect. Industry classification is based on Fama-French 48 industries. Crisis period are 
defined as the month with extreme value of forward-looking risk premium. The z values in the brackets are 
computed from the robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Probability of default and firms with negative net income    
Low FFLRP  Median FFLRP High FFLRP Diff(High ‐ Low) 
Mean PD  3.64  4.25 12.44 8.80  ***
     T‐value  (9.89) 









(1)    (2)   (3)    (4)  
FFLRPt-1(τ)  ‐0.296  ***  0.765 ***  ‐0.0338 ‐0.202
(‐5.09)  (‐2.92) (‐0.33) (‐1.57)
FFLRPt‐1(τ) × PD  0.00699  ***  0.0107 *** 
(9.59)  (5.19)
PD  ‐0.0192  ***  ‐0.0212 *** 
(‐16.04)  (‐16.38)
FFLRPt‐1(τ) × NegNI  0.225 **  0.232
(2.20) (1.59)
NegNI  ‐0.155 ***  ‐0.161 *** 
(‐3.67) (‐3.61)
Size  0.150  ***  0.180 ***  0.144 ***  0.178 *** 
(21.87)  (26.08) (21.12) (25.72)
log(M/B)  0.663  ***  0.719 ***  0.665 ***  0.723 *** 
(40.10)  (44.42) (40.07) (44.57)
Beta  0.146  ***  0.127 ***  0.114 ***  0.118 *** 
(11.53)  (9.93) (7.51) (7.83)
Cash  ‐0.897  ***  ‐0.700 ***  ‐0.914 ***  ‐0.703 *** 
(‐9.70)  (‐7.73) (‐9.83) (‐7.73)
Age  ‐0.0245  ***  ‐0.0246 ***  ‐0.0246 ***  ‐0.0247 *** 
(‐16.73)  (‐17.08) (‐16.68) (‐17.05)
OIBD  ‐0.0776  0.273 ‐0.0412 0.311 * 
(‐0.51)  (1.58) (‐0.27) (1.78)
Capex  1.499  ***  1.456 ***  1.491 ***  1.443 *** 
(11.09)  (11.01) (10.97) (10.86)
RD  2.044  ***  2.109 ***  2.064 ***  2.123 *** 
(11.35)  (11.23) (11.41) (11.23)
RDD  0.194  ***  0.230 ***  0.202 ***  0.237 *** 
(5.66)  (6.68) (5.86) (6.85)
Rt‐4,t‐1  0.356  ***  0.351 ***  0.356 ***  0.351 *** 
(16.71)  (16.29) (16.61) (16.22)
IPGrowtht‐1  0.0143  **  0.0180 ***  0.0175 **  0.0208 *** 
(2.07)  (2.60) (2.48) (2.95)
               
Industry fixed effect  Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes  
Log likelihood  ‐32,714  ‐32,908 ‐32,443 ‐32,650
Nobs  1,637,927  1,636,987 1,606,799 1,611,158
Nobs SEO  5,321  5,316 5,286 5,281





Table 9: SEO Announcement Returns and Distress Likelihood 
This table presents the announcement period cumulative abnormal return, including the 
interaction terms of cost of equity with probability of default and negative net income. 
Abnormal returns for individual firms are measured using Carhart (1997) four factor 
model. FFLRP is the firms' one-month forward-looking risk premium at the month-end 
prior to the announcement month. Probability of default (PD) is calculated from 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) model and measured prior to announcement month. NegNI is 
a dummy variable set to 1 if the firms have a negative income prior to SEO. ∆SHR is 
proportional change in outstanding shares of common stock, measured as logarithm of 
number of shares issued over outstanding shares. ∆LEV is the change in debt equity ratio 
due to the offering, where debt is measured as the book value and equity is measured as 
the market value of common stock. CON is shareholder concentration, which is 
measured as the logarithm of total market value of stocks, divided by the total number of 
shareholders. RUNUP is cumulative stock return over the three-month period prior to the 
offering month. ∆Bret is the three-month bond return calculated from 10 years bond 
index prior to the offering month. IPGrowth is the growth rate of industrial production 
for the three months prior to the offering month. T-statistics are computed from robust 
standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
CAR(‐1,+1)
FFLRPt‐1(τ)  ‐0.684 * ‐2.178  ** 
(‐1.66) (‐2.52) 




















Const.  ‐2.847 *** ‐2.538  *** 
(‐3.50) (‐3.36) 







Table 10: Post-SEO Change of Debt 
This table presents the regression of changes in book debts for SEO firms in the year after the 
SEO issuance on the forward-looking cost of equity and control variables. The change in book 
debt is measured as the change in book debt in the year after SEO divided by the total assets 
right after SEO issuance. MFLRP and FFLRP are the market and firms' forward-looking risk 
premium, measured prior to the SEO month. Other explanatory variables are measured at the 
quarter-end immediately following SEO issuance. The market-to-book ratio (M/B) is assets 
minus book equity plus market equity all divided by assets. Fixed assets intensity (PPE/A) is 
defined as net property, plants and equipment divided by assets. Profitability (EBITDA/A) is 
defined as operating income before depreciation, divided by assets. Firm size is defined as the 







(M/B)t  0.0121 * 0.0124 * 0.0126  * 
(1.74) (1.78) (1.80) 
(PPE/A)t  ‐0.0510 ‐0.0495 ‐0.0527 
(‐0.96) (‐0.93) (‐0.99) 
(EBITDA/A)t  0.137 0.104 0.101 
(0.76) (0.58) (0.57) 
log(S)t  ‐0.00740 ‐0.00626 ‐0.00592 
(‐1.40) (‐1.18) (‐1.11) 
Dt/A  ‐0.0450 ‐0.0450 ‐0.0440 
(‐1.07) (‐1.07) (‐1.04) 
Const.  0.204 *** 0.207 *** 0.210  *** 
(3.45)   (3.52)   (3.56)    
Industry fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes    
Adj. R‐sq  7.30% 7.30% 7.40% 





Figure 1: Number of SEOs  
This figure plots the number of monthly SEOs from 1970 to 2009. The SEO sample is obtained from SDC database. The 
sample only includes SEOs with some primary offerings, and listed in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Financial and 
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Figure 2: The Forward-looking Market Risk Premium 
This figure plots the monthly forward-looking market risk premium from 1970 to 2009. The method to compute the 
forward-looking market risk premium is based on Duan and Zhang (2011). The forward-looking market risk premium is 
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